On April 22 in aviation disaster history…

April 22, 1974


Photos from Conrad Bali Resort & Spa Workers

possible coordinates, read more belowpossible coordinates

Remembering Pan Am Flight 812 // Clipper Climax

April marks the 41st anniversary for the 4 hour and 20 minute long Pan American Airways voyage, with a 4 hour and 23 minute expected flight time, that ended in an unfortunate loss of all 107 lives onboard onboard International Scheduled Passenger Flight 812. The Boeing 707-321B was operated by Pan American World Airways with the registration number N446PA.

Interestingly, Clipper Climax was the jet used in the 1971 film Willy Wonka & the Chocolate Factory, as the aircraft used to deliver the much sought-after shipments of Wonka bars to candy stores around the world.

There used to be two flights a week through Bali, and they were the only non-Indonesian flights allowed outside of Jakarta at the time. The plane crashed into rough mountainous terrain in Bali’s remote northwest, while preparing for a runway approach in Denpasar, the capital and the most populous city of the Indonesian province of Bali. Last radio contact was made at 10:26PM local time. All times on this page are related to Indonesia Western Time, seven hours in advance (UTC+7).

Timeline of Events

Pan American’s Flight No. 812 departed Hong Kong on April 22, 1974, bound for Los Angeles, California with intermediate stops at Indonesia’s Bali International Airport at Denpasar, the Fiji Islands, Sydney, Australia, and Hawaii.

Take-off commenced at 06:08PM. They allocated flight level 330 from Hong Kong until BTT and then proceeded at flight level 350 until Denpasar.

The flight proceeded normally, and position reports while in Indonesian UIR were carried out through Jakarta Radio on frequency 5673 kHz.

At 9:28PM, the flight was cleared by Jakarta area Control Centre to descend to flight level 280. They established first contact with Bali Tower at 10:06PM, through Tower Frequency 118.1 MHz, and was instructed to contact Bali control on frequency 128.3 kHz.

At 10:08PM, the flight informed Bali Control of revised ETA 1527. A clearance to descend to flight level 100 was given by Bali Control ,and at 10:09PM a request was made by the aircraft for active runway. Runway in use 09 was passed on by Bali Control to the aircraft.

During the descent to flight level 120, after observing that one of the ADF needles had swung, at 10:19PM the flight reported over the station turning outbound and was subsequently instructed to contact Bali Tower.

Twenty-five seconds later, they established contact with Bali Tower, informing outbound procedure, followed by a request for lower altitude.

Clearance was then given to descend to 2,500 ft and were instructed to report reaching 2,500 ft.

At 10:23PM, the aircraft reported reaching 2,500 and Bali Tower gave instructions to continue approach, and to report when runway was in sight. Acknowledgement was made by saying “Check inbound”.

At 10:26PM, the pilot-in-command requested the visibility by calling “Hey – Tower, what is your visibility out there now?”

However, according to the transcription of Air Traffic Control voice recorder, this message was never received by Bali Tower. Apparently, this was the last message transmitted by the aircraft.

Bali Tower kept trying to contact the aircraft by calling “Clipper eight one two, Bali Tower” and “Clipper eight one two, Bali Tower, how do you read” several times. However, no answer was received from the aircraft.

It was subsequently found that the aircraft hit the top of a remote, rough mountain terrain, approximately 37 NM North-West of Ngurah Rai Airport. The starboard wing broke off, and separated into four pieces. Then the left wing hit a ridge, and broke into three parts. The fuselage came to rest and burst into flames.

Location

The exact location of the wreckage is not precisely known through official records. Disaster In The Air by Edgar A. Haine refers to them as the Singa Singa Mountains and further explains:

The plane had crashed on Mesehe Mountain, an inactive volcano, which rises steeply out of the jungle and had an altitude of around 4,000 feet above sea level.

An inspection of the crash scene showed the Boeing 707 had hit the peak at an elevation of 3,700 feet, only needing 300 feet more to clear the top.

In 2010 through the Aviation forums, a since-deleted user named BMIFlyer, from the UK, posted their resolution of the final coordinates using google earth, plotting a course of 37 NM NW of Bali Airport, at a location with an altitude of 915m (3000 ft) ASL. This is a very rough guess but the terrain matches the location of the crash site description and can be viewed at this link.

The Victims

No identification or toxicological examination of the victims could be made. The official number of 96 passengers and 11 crew (107 dead total) was based on the passenger manifest and crew list.

Pan Am reported that about seventy passengers were tourists bound for a holiday in Bali. The nationalities were as follows: 29 Japanese, 18 French, 17 Americans, 16 Australians, 5 Germans, 3 Canadians, 3 Filipinos, 3 Indonesians, 2 Taiwanese, and 1 Indian. 6 Americans were from New York City.

William Pierce reported about 28 Americans on the flight.

wikileaks remaining ever helpful, though with confusing text, grants us an insight into the victims of this accident:

1. THE FOLLOWING ARE NAMES OF AMERICAN PASSENGERS AND CREW APRIL 22 FLIGHT 812 WHICH CRASHED IN BALI AS REPORTED TO VICE CONSUL FROM PAN AM OFFICES HONG KONG VIA PAN AM JAKARTA AFTERNOON APRIL 23:  JOHN CAUSEY; VIRGINIA CAUSEY; DON E. WOLCOTT; SONIA BLOCK; SIGNE CAROLINE BURKLAND; MRS. BARYL HEATON: JOHN ALLEN HEDGE: OLIVE HEDGE: MRS. JOSEPHINE CHENLER LEE: ARTHUR H. SINGER: ELIZABETH SINGER: IRVING VERNON: BARBARA VERNON: EDWARD WOLFE: SUSAN WOLFE: DONALD B. ZINKE: MONSERENO CALIFORNIA: JOHN E. SCHROEDER, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA MELVIN A. PRATT, GREAT FALLS, MONTANA: EDWARD J. KEATING, SAN RAFAEL, CALIFORNIA; TIMOTHY B. CROWLEY, BELMONT, CALIFORNIA; MARY L. BUTTERWORTH, MANKATO, MINN; BEVERLY UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED PAGE 02  JAKART 04904  231012Z A. SCHMITT, WESTMINSTER, COLORADO; JANICE SANNING, VICTORIA TEXAS; DONNA C. KENT, PARK FORREST, ILLINOIS. 2.  TWO NAMES HAVE CONFUSING SURNAMES ARRON DANIEL OR DANIEL ARRON AND MAURICE REYMOND OR RAYMOND MAURICE. 3.  SIX PASSENGERS ARE STILL OF UNKNOWN NATIONALITY: MRS. K. MARSHALL, MISS F. MOSEY, P.S. GANAELQFMM. PRUSKIL, WYSOKIER, AND MISS E. TUBBS. NEWSOM

The cockpit crew consisted of Captain Donald Zinke, First Officer John Schroeder, Third Officer Melvin Pratt, and Flight Engineers Timothy Crowley & Edward Keating. The 96 passengers were looked after by Pursers Mary Butterworth & Beverly Schmitt and Flight Attendants Ann Beran, Janice Fanning, Ingrid Johansson, & Donna Kent.

The pilot-in-command, aged 52, held a valid airline transport pilot’s licence endorsed for Douglas DC-4 and Boeing 707/720. At the time of the accident he had flown a total of 18 247 hours including 7 192 hours in Boeing 707/720 aircraft. His last FAA medical examination took place on 13 December 1973, with a limitation to wear glasses while flying an aircraft. He had flown 33 hours during the last 30 days and 3:40 hours during the 24 hours prior to the accident. His last proficiency check was carried out on 24 October 1973. His last entry to Denpasar was on 16 May 1973 on flight PA-811 from Sydney to Hong Kong via Denpasar.

The first officer, aged 40, held a valid ATPL endorsed for Boeing 707/720. At the time of the accident he had flown a total of 6 312 hours including 4 776 hours in Boeing 707/720 aircraft. His last FAA medical examination took place on 5 December 1973 and there were no limitations imposed. He had flown 40 hours during the last 30 days and 3:40 hours during the 24 hours prior to the accident. His last proficiency check was carried out on 7 December 1973. His last entry to Denpasar was on 16 July 1973 on flight PA-812 from Hong Kong to Sydney via Denpasar.

The second officer, aged 38, held a valid Commercial pilot’s licence and a current instrument rating. At the time of the accident he had flown a total of 4 255 hours including 3 964 hours in Boeing 707/720 aircraft. His last FAA medical examination took place on 8 March 1974 with no limitations imposed. He had flown 74:27 hours during the last 30 days and 3:40 hours during the 24 hours preceding the accident. His last Proficiency check was carried out on 15 February 1974. His last entry to Denpasar was On 27 February 1974 on flight PA-812 from Sydney to Hong Kong via Denpasar.

The flight engineer, aged 48, held a valid flight engineer’s licence. At the time of the accident he had flown a total of 14 375 hours including 7 175 hours in Boeing 707/720 aircraft. His last FAA medical examination took place on 5 November 1973 with a limitation to wear glasses while on duty in the aircraft. He had flown 26 hours during the last 30 days and 3:40 hours during the 24 hours preceding the accident. His last proficiency check ride was carried out on 21 March 1974. His last entry to Denpasar was on 17 December 1973 on flight PA-812 from Hong Kong to Sydney via Denpasar. The second flight engineer, aged 43, held a valid flight engineer’s licence. At the time of the accident he had flown a total of 7 986 hours including 4 965 hours in Boeing 707/720 aircraft. His last FAA medical examination took place on 6 August 1973 with a limitation to wear glasses while on duty in the aircraft. He had flown 32 hours during the last 30 days and 3:40 hours during the 24 hours prior to the accident. His last proficiency check ride was carried out on 8 January 1974. His last entry to Denpasar was on 16 January 1974 on flight P4-811 from Sydney to Hong Kong via Denpasar.

The Aircraft and Wreckage

The aircraft was totally destroyed, and any damage was confined to the forest at the crash site.

The Boeing 707-321 C had the serial number 19268 and was delivered to Pan American World Airways on December 16, 1966. The total airframe hours since new until the last recorded maintenance was 27,943 hours. The total landings (cycles) were 9,123 up to the last recorded maintenance. The last recorded maintenance was accomplished at Hong Kong Airport at the termination of flight number 811 on April 22, 1974.

The Certificate of airworthiness of the aircraft was valid and the aircraft had been maintained in accordance with a continuous programme. The powerplants were four Pratt and Whitney JT3D model 3 BAB engines. From the aircraft maintenance log, it appeared that all actions to correct discrepancies had been taken and properly accomplished. All Airworthiness Directives, Engineering Authorizations and Quality Control Authorizations had been complied with. The last “A” check was accomplished at a ship time of 27,943 hours on April 22, 1974 at Hong Kong Airport, whereas the last “B” check was accomplished on April 13, 1974 at total aircraft time of 27,838 hours.

Engine serial number 667727 was installed on N 446 PA on April 18, 1974 in the number four position. At the time of the last recorded maintenance, at the termination of flight number 811/20 at Hong Kong Airport, the total engine time was 20,049 hours. The total engine cycles were 6,040. The last combustion area inspection at TSO 19,999, was done on a Periodic/Shop Visit on July 5, 1973. The test cell run was made on April 2, 1974.

On March 20, 1975, the Ministry of Transport in Indonesia released a report describing the wreckage:

The accident occurred in rough mountainous terrain with trees 20 to 30 m high. The crash site is located at an elevation of about 3000 feet above mean sea level and approximately 37 NM North-West of Ngurah Rai Airport. Judging from the cuts of trees, the aircraft’s heading prior to impact was estimated to be between 155 and 160 degrees. It appeared from the cuts of the trees that aircraft hit the mountain in a banked position.

The aircraft disintegrated after its final impact and the wreckage was scattered within a radius of 50 m from the point of impact.

Thorough investigation at the crash site revealed that no fire broke out prior to the accident. Further examination of the wreckage disclosed the main and nose landing gears were in down and locked positions. It was found that the right-hand wing tip struck several trees first at approximately 50 m from the impact point and then the aircraft entered a gap about 100 feet wide between two large trees. The right wind was sheared off at its root and broken into four parts. The left wing struck a ride and was broken into three separate parts. It was observed that a burnt area was shown close to the main impact area, which indicated that fire broke out immediately after impact.

From the distribution of the wreckage, no evidence of in-flight explosion could be found.”

There is much belief the wreckage still lies in the mountainous terrain, though not much left and most likely covered in vegetation. Attempts to visit the site since have been unsuccessful.

Weather

According to the meteorological report for take-off and landing made by the meteorological officer at Bali Airport at 1500, the surface weather at Bali Airport was as follows:

Date and time: April 22, 1974, 3:00PM GMT.
Surface wind: 110/5 kt.
Horizontal visibility: 8 NM.
Cloud: 1 Oktas Cu 2 000 ft.
Altimeter setting: 1 011.6 mb or 29.87 in Hg.
Pressure at aerodrome elevation: 1 011.1 mb or 29.86 in Hg.

According to eyewitness observations, the weather at the accident site was a clear (cloudless) starry sky.

Flight Recorders

The aircraft was equipped with a flight data recorder and a cockpit voice recorder. Both recorders were found on the 16 and 18 of July 1974, respectively, after an intensive two-week search at the crash site.

The flight data recorder had the serial number 443 and the cockpit voice recorder had the serial number 870. They were sent to the National Transportation Safety Board, USA, for read-out and evaluation.

The flight data recorder was a LAS 169-C model having serial number 443. Examination of the cassette showed minor mechanical damage. The foil recording medium was removed from the cassette and found to have several mechanical tears and deformation due to impact, apparently as a result of the accident. No evidence of fire or heat damage was noted on the cassette or foil. It was noted that 311 parameter traces had been recorded at the time of the accident. Basic reference measurements disclosed that the recorder had been operating in a manner consistent with the current calibration, with no evidence of recorder malfunction or recording abnormalities. The read-out done by the NTSB laboratory was started at a point when the aircraft was at cruising altitude of 34,000 ft and covered the last 39 minutes and 30 seconds of recorder operations. The read-out covers a period of several seconds after impact, however, the tract point of impact was not definitely established.

The cockpit voice recorder was also recovered and sent to the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board for evaluation. It yielded a good readable tape and a transcription that was made of the last thirty minutes of the flight. The NTSB’s comprehensive read out indicated that evaluation started at cockpit voice recorder time of 09:56:14PM and the read-out indicated that tile impact occurred at 10:26:42.9PM. A review of the tape revealed that the cockpit voice recorder been operating satisfactorily up to the time of the accident.

Final Analysis

Examination of the wreckage and inspection of the site indicated that no structural failure of the aircraft occurred before impact. No indication of any malfunctioning of engines or break up prior to impact of the aircraft with the ground was found. The Board did not find any evidence that may indicate that the aircraft was not in an airworthy condition at the time of the accident. Subsequently communication between the aircraft and the ground was normal. The cockpit voice recorder further disclosed that the pilot-in-command had encountered no difficulty with the procedures to land at Bali Airport, in which it was mentioned to maintain at 12,000ft until the beacon, and then to execute the full ADF let-down procedure.

The cockpit voice recorder disclosed that the pilots were aware of the existence of a 7,000ft mountain, 26 miles North of Bali Airport, and another 10,000ft mountain north-north-fast of the airport, and that flight level 120 would clear them from the mountains mentioned above.

From the conversation amongst flight crew members, it was further disclosed that the estimated time of arrival was 10:27PM, which was passed to Bali Control. The pilot intended to make a right hand turn within 25 miles from the beacon, for a track out on 261 degrees, descending to 1,500ft followed by a procedure turn over the water for final approach on Runway 09, which was the runway in rise given by Bali Control.

As recorded by the cockpit voice recorder at approximately 10:18PM, the crew observed that ADF number one was swinging, while ADF number two remained steady.

A few seconds later, at 10:19PM, PA-812 reported to Bali Control that he was over the station, turning outbound descending to flight level 120. This was acknowledged by Bali Control and PA-812 was then instructed to change over to Bali Tower.

Having established contact with Bali Tower, PA-812 reported making outbound procedure flight level 110 and requested lower altitude. Clearance was given by Bali Tower to descend to 2,500ft, with instructions to report at that height. At 10:23PM, PA-812 reported reaching 2,500ft.

The crew, in an attempt to expedite their approach into Bali Airport, elected to execute an early right hand turn for track out on 263 degrees. By using this type of approach, they were prevented from knowing their tract position. Such an early turn would necessitate the pilot’s obtaining an early indication on the ADF that the was nearing the NDB.

Evidently, the right hand turn was made at the time when only one of the ADF needles swung. According to the reconstruction of the flight path, based on information obtained from the flight recorder, it is evident that the right hand turn was made at a position approximately 30 NM North of the beacon.

Although several attempts were made to regain proper indication on the ADFs after the turn, the Board believes that this would not have been possible since the aircraft would be shielded by the mountain range. However, the approach was continued as planned resulting in a collision with high ground.

The flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder read-outs revealed no evidence of any aircraft abnormality during any part of the flight prior to the accident.

Conclusions

Findings

  1. The aircraft was properly certificated and airworthy at the time of accident.
  2. There was no sign of explosion prior to impact.
  3. There was no evidence of any break up in flight.
  4. There was also no sign that may have indicated a possible fire prior to the impact
  5. The flight crew was properly licensed, and experienced to carry out the flight. However, from the available data, the Board was led to believe that the pilot-in-command was not very familiar with the Indonesian Aeronautical Information Publication, specifically related to local procedures at Bali International Airport.
  6. The weight and centre of gravity of the aircraft were within allowable limits at the time of the accident.
  7. One of the ADFs swung, while the other remained steady, when the aircraft was still about 30 NM North of the beacon.
  8. At this point, the pilot initiated a let-down procedure by making a right hand turn for track out on 263 degrees, assuming that he was nearing the NDB.
  9. No evidence was found regarding the possibility of interference to the ADF induced by radio broadcasting station.
  10. The Board has not succeeded in determining the cause of the needle swing of one of the ADFs. It may have been caused by either external or internal interference.

Consequences/Recommendations

  1. Operators should encourage pilots towards a more thorough knowledge of the aeronautical information published in the Operations Manual for a certain airport, to avoid the possibility of divided attention during the critical stages of the approach.
  2. Vigilant observation by the Operator’s Flight Safety Officer to help them avoid accidents due to human error during a possible accident prone stage in the course of their career would be welcomed by even highly experienced pilots.
  3. Although it has no bearing on this particular accident, the installation of a DME in addition to the existing VOR at Denpasar would be of great help to aircraft.

The crash was a wake up call for Pan Am. Flight 812 was the third 707 the airline had lost in the Pacific (region of operation, Pacific and Australasia operation) in less than a year after Flight 806 in Pago Pago, hitting a low hill on January 30, 1974 in a thunderstorm and bursting into flames, killing 96 of the 101 on board, and Flight 816 in Papeete, plunging on July 22, 1973 after a takeoff from Tahiti, killing 78 people. The third incident was Pan Am Flight 160 on November 3, 1973, which crashed on approach to Logan International Airport. Smoke in the cockpit (believed to be from the cargo) caused the pilots to lose control. Three crewmen were killed in the hull-loss accident.

The crews of all three planes had senior captains known as “Sky-Gods.” Pan Am’s culture had instilled a superiority complex in these veterans, making them believe they were invincible. This lead to the errors that brought down Flight 806, 812, and 816 in less than a year. Following the crash Pan Am addressed the issue and encouraged an early form of CRSM. The Bali crash was the final 707 lost following the safety improvements.

Around April 24, 1974, due to the April 22 crash, the Federal Aviation Administration ordered an in-depth inspection of the airline’s worldwide flight operations including pilot training, area qualification, operational procedures, pilot supervision and scheduling, line-check procedures, and other related matters of safety. The FAA did not criticize Pan American Airways or imply unsafe operations. They estimated about 3 months investigation time.

On May 8, 1974, Pan American Airways ordered the installation of a new cockpit warning device designed to prevent crashes such as this April 22 incident. The entire fleet of 140 airplanes under Pan Am received the device. The apparatus was engineered and manufactured by Sundstrand Data Control, Inc. The ground proximity warning system provided additional indications, for example if a plane was heading for a mountain slope or if it was too low for a landing. This was an automatic supplement to more conventional altitude warning systems, already installed on most Pan Am airlines.

Rescue Operations and Investigation

The crash site apparently took three days ultimately for a U.S. military team to get to, although the Balinese could get there in about 12 hours. The plane wrecked in a very undeveloped area of Bali, covered in a jungle-like atmosphere. Bali rescue teams including Indonesian army units, doctors and ambulances were mobilized and sent out to locate the wreck. Taking nearly a full day for 30 men to make it through the dense atmosphere and up the mountain, they found that there were no survivors.

Pan Am officials, representatives from the Indonesian government, crash investigators, diplomatic personnel from various countries and crash experts from the United States National Transportation Safety Board filled hotels in Bali on April 23. A command post was established in the Bali Beach Hotel by Pan Am.

By April 24, Rangers of the Indonesian army grew to 300 men and began to remove bodies from the crash scene in the difficult area. They used methods such as lowering bodies by rope down the steep inclines. An idea to remove victims by helicopter was abandoned due to dangerous air currents and terrain. They estimated about a week to remove all bodies, weather providing. There was only about 1½ miles to the base camp at the village of Tinga Tinga, direct, but had earlier taken Rangers 7 hours to reach the wreckage by climbing.

William Pierce served as the General Services Officer (GSO) in Surabaya, Indonesia from 1973 to 1975.About 1:00AM, he received a phone call about the missing plane. He remembers his story in manyarticles:

We had been aware of how many people were on the aircraft. Around about 10:00 a.m. we found ourselves in northwest Bali looking up at a mountain, perhaps two or three miles away, and with binoculars, at the very top of it you could see sort of a black char.

Apparently the Pan Am plane, as I understand it – and this is from reading some transcript of the black box several years later  – navigationally strayed and was not where it was supposed to be. It was supposed to be coming into an approach at the airport to the south of the island and instead found this 10,000-foot mountain in its path on the northwest side. I cannot remember if this navigation error was described in the NTSB [National Transportation Safety Board] report on it.

The plane hit some of the mountain, broke probably into the portion that dropped over the mountain. As I found out, it was only then that the aircraft fuel engulfed the plane and combustion occurred and anybody who would’ve been alive at that time would’ve been annihilated.

Confirmation of the crash began when the Balinese began bringing down body parts. There were no full bodies, but some torsos. They were brought down and put in bags. The FBI team was there to try to help with identification although to me it didn’t seem possible that this could happen. They set up a workshop in the hangar down in Denpasar and were convinced that they would be in a position to identify some of the remains.

Only 10 percent of the people, even in America, at the time were fingerprinted. Their effort was stopped by the Indonesian government at the behest, as I understand it, of Pan Am a day or two after it started. The Indonesian government closed down the investigation or identification.

He also recalls at least one victim’s family member:

There was one I knew well who was waiting at the airport in Denpasar and she wanted to visit the site. She never did. You couldn’t get to the site. Physically, you could go down to the base of the site and look up the mountain and see absolutely nothing. But she stayed for quite a long time.”

Reports from the scene indicted the many bodies had been thrown out of the plane and were scattered as far as 400 yards from the impact point.

By the afternoon of April 24, Col. Umar Said, in charge of the Indonesian Rangers, stated that 43 “badly burned bodies” had been recovered, but removal would be delayed until April 25, “after body bags and food supplies for the troops had been dropped by helicopter.”

At this point, investigators still had no idea what the cause of the crash even was. The crews assembled once more on Mesehe Mountain, on April 25. That morning, they were to listen to the control tower tapes of conversations with the plane’s pilot, Captain Donald B. Zinke of California. They had not yet found the flight data recorder. There was evidence to assume he had approached for a landing from the northwest, across the mountains. This was not the safer approach, which was from the west, across Selat Bali, a bay like body of water south and west of the island.

Burials and Monuments

The FBI had to give up trying to identify the bodies after only a few days. Two ceremonies were held on the beach thereafter – a cremation for the Shinto Japanese, and burial for the French Catholics.

William Pierce remembers:

The one thing I was able to extract was a promise that the Indonesian government would produce death certificates, which we could use to process the report of American citizens’ death. The problem with the remains that we did have, and they were substantial – several body bags – was that the Japanese side, the Shinto Japanese, wanted to see Japanese citizens cremated. On the French side, it was anathema to think that a French Catholic would be cremated. So the body bags were divided, and obviously not everyone in one body bag being burned was a Shinto, and everybody in the ones that were being buried was a French Catholic. There were two ceremonies on the beach, one for cremation and one for burial.

The April 22, 2014 commemoration of Bali’s worst air crash was held at the Pan American Monument, which is inscribed with the names of the deceased and is located on the banks of the Ayung River at Padang Galak.

Several Memorial Plaques can be found for the crash in Jalan Padang Galak, next to the beach Temple, Kesiman, Denpasar East, Indonesia.

Bali News article “Gone, But Not Forgotten”, © Bali Discovery Tours at http://www.balidiscovery.com, discusses the Balinese-style monument erected in the South, on the beach at Padang Galak, shortly after the crash. The dignified and serene monument bearing all the names of the 107 who died from 11 countries sits amidst a clump of trees on the bank of the Ayung River in Denpasar, just 5-10 minutes from the busy Jalan Ngurah Bypass in Padang Galak.

Over the intervening four decades, the monument has suffered a gradual decline resulting from the encroachments of the now-defunct Taman Festival and a benign neglect born of the passing years and fading memories.

Prompted by the recollection that among those who perished on that fateful night in 1974 wasMaurice Raymond, the Corporate Vice-President for Food & Beverage of Hilton International, a group of Raymond’s modern day “Hilton colleagues” from the Conrad Bali Resort & Spa recently descended on the memorial to undertake a general clean-up and make Balinese offerings for the peaceful repose of the air tragedy victims.

With perhaps the exception of Conrad’s Ruth Zuckerman, most of the 40 Conrad Bali Resortemployees who participated in the clean-up and prayers were not yet born when the original tragedy occurred. Yet, on an island where life and family are all important and viewed in “cyclical” terms, those who participated in the rejuvenation of the once-neglected shrine have pledged to look after the memorial and ensure that prayers and offering are now regularly made at a hallowed corner of Padang Galak beach.”

The photo below is from the Conrad Bali Resort & Spa Workers.

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Above in this photo, from left to right: Conrad Bali Director of Business Development, Kevin Girard; Eileen Keating and Kathleen Keating (daughters of Flight Engineer Edward Joseph Keating); Scott Moser (grandson of Captain Donald Bain Zinke) and Conrad Bali General Manager, Jean-Sebastien Kling. Read more at http://www.etbtravelnews.com.

This year’s [2014] inauguration ceremony, presided over by Master of Ceremony Mr. Anak Agung Gede Rai, commenced at 3:45PM local time with a traditional Hindu prayer offering followed by a bagpipe rendition of “Amazing Grace” and a musical tribute by the International Gamelan Orchestra.

The Bali Community Choir performed and there were readings of Islamic, Catholic, Protestant, Hindu and Buddhist prayers. Conrad Bali’s team representatives, led by general manager Jean-Sébastien Kling, read all of the victims’ names aloud, with a gong sounding between each name.

The ceremony concluded with a soloist singing “Lilin Lilin Kecil”, literally translated as “Small Candles” and written by famous local artist Chrisye. During the performance guests participated in the lighting of 107 candles. Conrad Bali’s team will remain committed to the caretaking of the monument for years to come through its Tri Hita Karana committee, which champions all annual activities that connect the resort to the community: connecting people to the place, the culture and the surrounding environment.”
– Conrad Bali

Further reading:

The Final Accident Report
The Aviation Safety Network
Airlines.net Aviation Forums
ADST Article
Disaster in the Air by Edgar A. Haine
A Missed Departure, A Lifetime in Return
Bali History: Remembering
Gone, But Not Forgotten
2014 Commemoration Article
Possible Coordinates
World eBook Library
Wikileaks

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